We examine long-run firm performance following open market share repurchase announcements, 1980-1990. We find that the average abnormal four-year buy-and-hold return measured after the initial announcement is 12.1%. For 'value' stocks, companies more likely to be repurchasing shares because of undervaluation, the average abnormal return is 45.3%. For repurchases announced by 'glamour' stocks, where undervaluation is less likely to be an important motive, no positive drift in abnormal returns is observed. Thus, at least with respect to value stocks, the market errs in its initial response and appears to ignore much of the information conveyed through repurchase announcements.
Introduction
Corporations distribute substantial sums of wealth to shareholders by repurchasing their own stock. From 1980 to 1990, the aggregate value of stock repurchased on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (ASE), and the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) was about one-third of the value distributed as cash dividends. Toward the end of the 1980s, the dollars involved in repurchases increased substantially, becoming nearly half the amount paid as cash dividends. Framed differently, the dollar value of stock repurchases announced between 1985 and 1993 was nearly three times larger than that raised through initial public offerings (IPOs) . 1 In 1994, stock buybacks continued at a record pace, more than $65 billion were announced. Firms can reacquire shares either through tender offers or through open market transactions. Historically, managers have chosen the latter approach by wide margins. For example, 90% of the dollar value of all share repurchases announced between 1985 and 1993 were to be completed through open market transactions. In this paper, we examine the long-run performance of firms that chose this approach for repurchasing shares.
The literature provides a lengthy list of motivations for why corporations might repurchase their own shares: capital structure adjustment, takeover defense, signaling, excess cash distribution, substitution for cash dividends, and wealth expropriation from bondholders. While all of these reasons are plausible, signaling has emerged as one of the most prevalent explanations (Vermaelen, 1981; Dann, 1981; Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Ofer and Thakor, 1987; Constantinides and Grundy, 1989) . The Traditional Signaling Hypothesis, or TSH, is motivated by asymmetric information between the marketplace and a firm's managers. If, in management's assessment, the firm is undervalued, they might choose to buy back stock. Making such an announcement is thus argued as serving a valuable signal to a less informed marketplace. If markets respond efficiently, prices should adjust immediately in an unbiased manner. The new equilibrium price should fully reflect the 'true' value of the new information, and no wealth transfer should occur between long-term shareholders and those selling shares to the firm.
When managers are asked why they repurchase shares on the open market, the most commonly cited reason is 'undervaluation' and that their shares represent a 'good investment', two reasons seemingly consistent with the TSH (Baker, Gallagher, and Morgan, 1981; Dann, 1983; Wansley, Lane, and Sarkar, 'From 1985 to 1993 , the total value of all announced share repurchases recorded by Securities Data Company was $334 billion (excluding REITs and closed-end funds). The comparable dollar value of initial public offerings over the same period was $114 billion. 1989 ). Yet, paradoxically, if prices adjust instantaneously, how can the stock be a good investment for long-term shareholders? In an efficient market, the stock should no longer be undervalued after the announcement, thus eliminating the motivation to undertake the repurchase.
However, managers typically do not announce that they are canceling a repurchase program. This would suggest that the initial market reaction is too low. Given that the average market reaction is only on the order of 3%, this would indeed seem to be the case. It hardly seems plausible that managers would, first, have the ability to recognize such small valuation errors, and second, choose to react to such minor discrepancies. Placed in perspective, 3% is not that much greater than the daily standard deviation of returns for many stocks. If managers are reacquiring shares because of mispricing, it is likely that they perceive substantially greater valuation errors. For example, in October 1993, Midland Resources Inc., a U.S.-based oil and gas concern, announced an open market share repurchase for 5% of its shares. At the announcement, the chairman was quoted as saying: 'If you look at the amount of our reserves, we think (our stock) should be trading for about twice its current value. What it boils down to is, if you can buy a dollar for 50 cents, why not buy it?
We hypothesize that the market treats repurchase announcements with skepticism, leading prices to adjust slowly over time. We refer to this as the Underreaction Hypothesis, or UH. Evidence consistent with this hypothesis has been documented in a study on fixed-price tender offer stock repurchases. Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990) find that on average, prices remain at bargain levels for at least two years. Other examples of delayed market reactions include IPOs (Ritter, 1991) , mergers (Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker, 1992) , proxy contests (Ikenberry and Lakonishok, 1993) , and spinoffs (Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge, 1993) . In what is essentially the mirror image of a stock repurchase, Loughran and Ritter (1995) observe a sluggish response by the market to seasoned equity offerings.
Is it possible that the market fully incorporates the information conveyed through an open market repurchase? If so, we should observe that stock prices following the announcement are unbiased, and that long-run performance is not above average. Or, alternatively, do managers in fact really know what they are doing and are correct in their assessment that their stock is a good investment, even after the repurchase announcement? These fundamental questions motivate the remainder of this paper.
We examine a sample of 1,239 open market share repurchases announced between January 1980 and December 1990 by firms whose shares traded on the NYSE, ASE, or NASDAQ. Similar to the findings reported in earlier research, the average market response to the announcement of an open market share repurchase is 3.5%. Furthermore, this initial reaction is consistent with several predictions of the TSH. For example, the market reacts more favorably to announcements made by low market capitalization firms and by firms announcing large repurchase programs.
The most striking finding of this paper is that the information conveyed by open market share repurchases is largely ignored. Managers of firms that repurchase their own shares appear to have been correct, on average, in assuming that they can buy shares at bargain prices to the benefit of their long-term shareholders. Beginning in the month following the repurchase announcement, the average buy-and-hold return over the next four years is more than 12% above that of a control portfolio.
If undervaluation is an important motive overall, it should be particularly important for out-of-favor stocks, which tend to have high book-to-market ratios. Yet, surprisingly, the market reaction to repurchase announcements is similar across all book-to-market groups. Over the long run, however, the largest abnormal returns following buyback announcements are observed in high book-to-market firms. The average return over the next four years for a buy-and-hold portfolio of these stocks is 45.3% above that of a control portfolio of similar size and book-to-market firms. For low book-to-market firms, no abnormal performance is observed in long-run returns.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we describe the data and our sample. Issues regarding performance measurement and significance tests are discussed in Section 3. In Section 4, we examine daily returns surrounding the announcement of open market share repurchases. In Section 5, we examine long-run performance. In Section 6, we explore the determinants of long-run performance. In Section 7, we check the robustness of our findings. Conclusions are provided in Section 8.
Data
Our sample was formed by identifying all announcements reported in the Wall Street Journal from January 1980 through December 1990 that stated that a firm intended to repurchase its own common stock through open market transactions.
We examine all open market share repurchase announcements without regard to whether the programs were actually completed. We further require that these firms be included on the daily Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) NYSE and ASE tapes or daily CRSP NASDAQ tapes, as well as the annual industrial Compustat file at the time of the announcement. For most of our analysis, we exclude all announcements made in the fourth quarter of 1987. Following the 1987 crash, 777 NYSE, ASE, and NASDAQ firms announced either new or increased share repurchase programs totalling over $45 billion, largely in response to their low post-crash share prices. Although we also examined announcements made during this period, these cases are not included in the results we report in order to avoid having this unusual period dominate our study. Table 1 shows the distribution of the repurchase announcements by year, the average percentage of shares repurchased, and the dollar value of the repurchase announcements. These repurchases, if fully completed, would have totalled $142 billion. Over the entire 11-year period, sample companies announced repurchases for, on average, 6.6% of their outstanding shares. This percentage generally rose over our sample period. Table 1 also shows the distribution of announcements according to firm size. Size deciles were determined in the month prior to the announcement, and were based on market equity value relative to the universe of all NYSE and ASE stocks covered by both CRSP and Compustat. Our sample has a bias favoring larger firms. Nearly one-third of our sample is ranked in the two largest size deciles.
Methodology

Performance measurement
We examine both short-term returns surrounding the announcement and long-term performance following the announcement. Short-term performance is calculated over various windows from 20 days before to 10 days following the announcement. When abnormal returns are calculated over such short intervals, the results are not overly sensitive to the benchmark used. Thus, we report results using a straightforward approach, calculating abnormal returns in relation to the CRSP equal-weighted index of NYSE and ASE firms. We also calculated short-term performance relative to other benchmarks, including the CRSP value-weighted index as well as a size-based approach, but the results were essentially the same.
Care must be taken when calculating long-run performance, because the findings can be sensitive to the procedures used (see Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter, 1992) . In this paper, we pursue two different approaches. The first is the more common technique based on cumulative abnormal returns (CARS) relative to some benchmark. The second approach calculates long-run abnormal performance assuming a buy-and-hold strategy. For both of these methods, abnormal returns are calculated relative to four benchmarks: the CRSP equal-and value-weighted indices of NYSE and ASE firms, a size-based benchmark, and a size-and book-to-market-based benchmark. This last benchmark is motivated by the recent work of French (1992, 1993) and Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) .
The CAR approach
Under the CAR approach, abnormal returns are calculated each month relative to a benchmark, and then aggregated over time. This procedure assumes monthly rebalancing, with sample firms receiving equal portfolio weights each month. Furthermore, abnormal performance is not based on compounded returns. Although takeovers and bankruptcies reduce the number of firms in the sample as event-time progresses, these cases are not excluded from our analysis. Abnormal performance is measured using the returns to all companies existing in a given event month, even those that eventually depart the sample.
Calculating performance relative to the CRSP equal-and value-weighted indices is straightforward and requires no further discussion. To calculate abnormal returns adjusted for size, we form ten size-based portfolios at the end of April each year, using all NYSE and ASE firms on both CRSP and Compustat. Monthly returns are calculated for these ten portfolios over the next year, assuming equal weighting. These returns are then used as benchmarks to measure abnormal performance. Each month, abnormal returns are calculated for each repurchase firm relative to its respective size benchmark. CARs are then calculated by averaging across all repurchase firms each month, and summing over time.
To calculate abnormal returns controlling for both size and book-to-market, each of the ten size deciles discussed above is further sorted by book-to-market ratio into quintiles. Quintile 1 contains the 20% of all stocks in a given size decile with the lowest book-to-market ratios. At the other extreme are the 20% of firms within a given size decile with the highest ratios. This sorting results in 50 benchmark portfolios for each month (10 size deciles times 5 book-to-market quintiles). As is done when we adjust only for size, all firms are ranked at the end of each April for the following 12 months. We assume a four-month lag in reporting financial results to avoid any look-ahead bias. Thus, for companies whose fiscal year ends in December, the book equity value will be recent. For firms with fiscal year-ends following December but preceding April, we calculate book-to-market ratios using book equity values from the prior year. Abnormal performance for each of the repurchase firms is then calculated using the appropriate size and book-to-market benchmark.
The buy-and-hold approach
The results obtained using the CAR approach should be regarded as descriptive in nature, since they do not represent a realistic investment strategy. However, our second approach presents a more feasible strategy. We assume an equal-weighted buy-and-hold investment in all repurchase firms beginning in the month following the announcement and continuing for 12 months. After one year, the portfolio is rebalanced, thus reducing the possibility that a small set of firms will dominate the return calculations. The multi-year total return to this investment strategy is calculated by compounding average annual returns over time.
If a firms departs the sample prematurely, we assume the investment is sold at the last available price on CRSP, and that the proceeds from this sale are reinvested for the remainder of the year in that firm's benchmark portfolio. At the end of the year, the portfolio is rebalanced, using only the surviving firms. Firms used to calculate benchmark returns were treated similarly.
To calculate abnormal performance, we form four benchmarks. These are similar in spirit to the four benchmarks created for the CAR approach, but calculated in a manner consistent with the buy-and-hold investment strategy. To save space, we report results only for the size and book-to-market benchmark approach. To form the reference portfolio, all firms listed on the NYSE and ASE and also carried on Compustat are sorted each month into one of 50 size and book-to-market portfolios, as described earlier. Beginning in the next month, the one-year buy-and-hold return is calculated for each firm in a given portfolio. The equal-weighted average of all annual returns in a given portfolio is then used as a benchmark return for firms ranked in that particular size and book-to-market rank at that point in time. Thus, this procedure leads us to compute annual buy-and-hold returns for each of the 50 benchmark portfolios each calendar month.
In addition to annual returns, we also measure compounded abnormal performance for two, three, and four years following the repurchase announcement. To calculate a two-year abnormal return, we take the difference between the compounded two-year return to repurchase firms, assuming rebalancing after the first year, and that of the reference portfolio. 4 Abnormal performance in years three and four is treated similarly.
Significance testing
Significance levels are calculated for daily, monthly, and annual returns. For daily cumulative abnormal returns, we use the event-time methodology outlined by Brown and Warner (1985) . Here, standard errors are estimated from the time series of daily portfolio abnormal returns calculated over days -250 to -21 relative to the repurchase announcement. Autocorrelation in daily abnormal returns in this study is low. Corrections we made for autocorrelation had essentially no impact on the results. Thus, we present t-tests that assume zero autocorrelation. To estimate significance levels for monthly CARS, we also use the event-time methodology described by Brown and Warner (1980) . Standard errors are calculated in a similar fashion, using months -36 to + 48 relative to the repurchase announcements. As before, we calculate t-tests assuming time independence, since corrections for autocorrelation had essentially no impact on the analysis.
For a variety of reasons, the approach described above is not appropriate when examining annual buy-and-hold or compounded multi-year returns. For example, estimating standard errors using an event-time approach requires a reasonable number of annual observations. Many firms simply do not have a long history of returns. Moreover, for those firms where the availability of returns is not an issue, it is questionable whether the return distribution is stable over such a long period of time. Further, since buy-and-hold returns are compounded rather than cumulated over time, multi-year standard errors cannot be simply inferred from annual standard errors. And finally, the skewness of long-run returns and the clustering of observations in time also pose problems for traditional significance tests.
Therefore, statistical inference of annual buy-and-hold and compounded multi-year returns is done via bootstrapping, as applied by Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron (1992) in their examination of technical trading strategies. Under this approach, we generate the empirical distribution of annual buy-and-hold and multi-year compounded abnormal returns under the null hypothesis. Specifically, for each repurchase announcement in our sample, we randomly select with replacement a firm listed on the NYSE or ASE that has the same size and book-to-market ranking at that point in time. We treat this randomly chosen company as if it had announced a repurchase on the same day as the corresponding repurchase firm. This matching process continues until each firm in our repurchase sample is represented in this pseudo-portfolio. This portfolio will have one randomly drawn firm for each actual repurchase firm, matched in time with similar size and book-to-market characteristics. After forming a single pseudo-portfolio, we estimate long-run performance in the same manner as we did for the repurchase sample. This yields one observation of the abnormal performance obtained from randomly forming a portfolio with the same characteristics as our repurchase sample. This entire process is repeated until we have 1,000 pseudo-portfolios, and thus 1,000 abnormal return observations. This provides us with an empirical approximation of the distribution of abnormal returns drawn under the null model specific to our sample. The null hypothesis served in the empirical distribution. The appeal of the bootstrap approach is that it avoids many of the problems that plague t-tests regarding assumptions over normality, stationarity, and time independence of observations. Departures from these basic assumptions are especially worrisome for returns calculated over long intervals, such as a year or more. To the extent that these problems exist in long-run returns, they are also present in our pseudo-portfolios, and thus are controlled for in our tests.
We also examine long-run firm performance by time period as well as by book-to-market ranking at the time of the repurchase announcement. The associated p-values are estimated by repeating the entire bootstrap procedure for each subsample. For example, when we report long-run performance for high book-to-market stocks announcing buybacks, the associated p-values are derived from the distribution of abnormal returns obtained from 1,000 pseudoportfolios specifically matched to this particular subsample. Table 2 provides a comprehensive analysis of short-term abnormal returns surrounding repurchase announcements in our sample. Looking at repurchase announcements overall, there are negative abnormal returns prior to the announcement, measured from days -20 to -3, totalling -3.07%. The average market reaction, measured from two days before through two days following publication of the announcement in the Wall Street Journal, is 3.54%. Following the announcement, returns appear on average to be quite similar to those of the market. This evidence is similar to the findings reported by other researchers examining repurchase announcements (for example, Vermaelen, 198 1; Comment and Jarrell, 1991) .
The initial market reaction changes only slightly across subperiods, decreasing from 4.25% between 1980 and 1983 to 2.33% in the period 1987 to 1990. Consistent with the TSH, larger share repurchase programs are received more favorably by the market. For example, the mean announcement period abnormal return is 4.51% for programs which are for more than 10% of outstanding shares. For those programs which are for less than 2.5% of outstanding shares, the average market reaction is 2.58%. Table 2 also reports short-term announcement returns according to the reason provided in the abstract of the Wall Street Journal Index. Some caution should be exercised here, since it is difficult to assess management's true motivation for the repurchase by reading such abbreviated press statements. Furthermore, no reason was mentioned in nearly 85% of the cases. But for the few cases in which a reason was mentioned, undervaluation was a prominent theme. For the 38 cases in which undervaluation was specifically mentioned, both the negative drift prior to the announcement ( -5.52%) and the market reaction at the announcement (5.31%) were comparatively large.
The size decile panel in Table 2 shows short-term performance by firm size. The market reaction shows clear differences across size groups. Firms ranked in the two smallest size deciles show the highest abnormal returns on average, 8.19%, more than double that observed overall. Those in the two largest size deciles exhibit an abnormal return of only 2.09%. If firm size is viewed as a proxy for information asymmetries, the observed relationship between size and abnormal returns is consistent with the TSH.
Separating the various motivations for undertaking an open market stock repurchase is difficult. One approach is to examine announcement returns in relation to book-to-market ratios. Firms with low book-to-market ratios are likely to repurchase shares for reasons other than undervaluation. At the other extreme, repurchases announced by firms with high book-to-market ratios, or value stocks, are more likely to have undervaluation as their primary motivation. However, we see in Table 2 that the market reaction to the repurchase announcement is similar across the five book-to-market quintiles. The average market reaction for firms in quintile 1 (glamour stocks) is 3.36%, while it is 3.56% for firms in quintile 5 (value stocks).
To further clarify the nature of announcement returns, we regressed announcement returns on various firm characteristics. To control for the possibility that positive announcement returns reflect mean reversion arising from negative returns observed prior to the announcement, we also included in the regression the CAR from days -20 to -3. Although not reported here, the results are consistent with the evidence reported in Table 2 , even after controlling for the impact of return reversals. As the percentage of shares announced for repurchase increases, the market reaction increases, and as firm size increases, announcement returns decline substantially. Yet, as before, the regression results provide no indication that the book-to-market ratio has any impact on the market reaction to repurchase announcements.
5. The long-term performance of firms repurchasing their own shares Fig. 1 plots CARs up to 48 months following a repurchase announcement, using four different benchmarks. These CARs are calculated beginning in month 1, and thus exclude the initial market reaction to the announcement. The picture that emerges is that firms that announce an open market stock repurchase tend to perform abnormally well in the long run. Focusing on size-adjusted returns, the CAR from month 1 to 36 is 8.69% (t = 2.50). Following month 36, abnormal returns are close to zero. This positive drift cannot be explained by the book-tomarket effect. When returns are adjusted for both size and book-to-market, the CAR from month 1 to 36 is nearly the same, 8.17% (t = 2.37). Focusing only on This figure plots the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) up to 48 months following the announcement of an open market share repurchase. Abnormal returns are calculated using four different methods; market-adjusted returns using the CRSP equal-weighted index of ASE and NYSE firms (EW CRSP), size-adjusted returns using equal-weighted portfolio returns of NYSE and ASE firms from the same size decile (Size Only), size and book-to-market adjusted returns using equal-weighted portfolio returns of NYSE and ASE firms from the same size decile and book-to-market quintile (Size & Book/Market), and market-adjusted returns using the CRSP value-weighted index of NYSE and ASE firms (VW CRSP).
the initial market reaction (3.5%), about 70% of the total valuation impact is ignored.
The picture is slightly different when the CRSP value-weighted index is used as a benchmark. Although post-announcement abnormal returns are positive, they are lower than when either the size-only or size and book-to-market benchmarks are used, and are about half that observed using the CRSP equal-weighted index. This occurs because large firms substantially outperformed smaller firms during the latter portion of our sample period.
Although the CAR approach is straightforward, the analysis is best regarded as descriptive in nature. A more appealing approach is the buy-and-hold procedure described earlier. The results using such an approach are reported in Table 3 . 5 The left-hand side of Table 3 shows mean annual returns from buying an equal-weighted portfolio of repurchasing firms, beginning in the month following the announcement and for the subsequent four years. To the right of this column are returns to the reference portfolio, calculated using the size and book-to-market benchmarks corresponding to the repurchase sample. The right side of Table 3 reports total compounded buy-and-hold returns up to four years, allowing for annual rebalancing. Results are also presented for two subperiods; announcements made in years 1980 to 1985 and those made in years 1986 to 1990.
The average return in the first year following the repurchase announcement is 20.80%, 2.04% more than the reference portfolio. This difference in annual returns increases to 2.31% and 4.59% in years 2 and 3, respectively. As we observed in Fig. 1 , the phenomenon appears to dissipate by year 4, when the difference is close to zero. Although not reported in the tables, we also examined performance in year 5 and again found abnormal returns close to zero ( -0.13%).
Turning to compounded returns, the difference in performance after four years is substantial, 12.14%. The p-value associated with this abnormal return is 0.012. In Fig. 2 , we plot the empirical distribution of four-year compounded abnormal returns under the null hypothesis based on our bootstrapping procedure, using 1,000 replications. From this figure, we see that the probability that a random portfolio will exhibit abnormal performance as high as our repurchase sample is remote. In our case, only 12 of the 1,000 pseudo-portfolios demonstrated compounded abnormal returns higher than 12.14% after four years. Focusing on year 3, the difference in compounded returns between the repurchase and the reference portfolio is 12.60% with a corresponding p-value of 0.000, meaning that none of the 1,000 pseudo-portfolios performed as well. Apparently, investing in companies that announce buybacks is a profitable long-run strategy, at least over the decade of the 1980s.
When we turn our attention to the two subperiods, we observe some differences in long-run performance. In the early subperiod, 1980-1985, the compounded abnormal return is 16.02% in year 3. This value decreases slightly to This histogram plots the empirical distribution of four-year compounded abnormal returns for 1000 bootstrap portfolios specific to our sample of repurchase announcements. Each portfolio is formed by taking the post-announcement returns for a given sample firm and replacing them with the returns to a firm randomly chosen from the NYSE or ASE with the same size and book-to-market classification at that point in time. This is done for each firm in the sample, thus forming a single portfolio. This entire process is then repeated until 1000 such portfolios are formed. The compounded abnormal performance from these randomly formed portfolios provides us with an empirical estimate of the distribution relevant to the entire sample of repurchase announcements in our study. The empirical distributions for subsamples are unique and are therefore estimated separately.
14.55% in year 4. In both years, abnormal performance is statistically significant at traditional confidence levels. In the later subperiod, 19861990, compounded abnormal performance after year 3 is 9.21% and is highly significant. In year 4, compounded abnormal performance increases slightly to 10.24%, but is only marginally significant. Of course, some variation from one subperiod to another is to be expected. Yet the impact of year 3 in the later subperiod and the focus of our study on the 1980s may give some cause for concern regarding robustness. Nevertheless, the results overall are significant. Moreover, we can look to other related papers which report evidence consistent with our findings. For example, Nelson (1994) uses CRSP data from 1926 to 1985 to examine firms that made substantial changes in the number of shares outstanding. He reports superior long-run performance for companies that decrease shares outstanding, most of which occurs prior to year 4. He also finds inferior long-run performance for firms that increase shares. In the context of tender offer repurchases, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990) also report evidence of a prolonged positive drift for announcements made between 1962 and 1986.
6. Undervaluation as a motive for open market share repurchases
Long-term performance by book-to-market quintile
Undervaluation appears to be an important factor motivating companies to repurchase shares. However, a variety of other motives also exist. An interesting question is whether the excess long-run performance we observe overall is more pronounced in those cases that are more clearly motivated by undervaluation. Identifying such firms ex ante is, of course, a challenge. One possibility, though, is to examine long-run performance conditional on book-to-market ratios.
Several recent studies report that firms with high book-to-market ratios have substantially higher returns than those with low book-to-market ratios. Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) find that this difference cannot be explained by risk, but is instead due to behavioral and institutional considerations. Many underpriced stocks have high book-to-market ratios. If the propensity to repurchase shares is related to the degree of underpricing, one would expect the most undervalued firms among those with high book-to-market ratios to be active in buybacks. If the market underreacts to buyback announcements, high book-to-market firms announcing buybacks should not only outperform the overall market, but also outperform a benchmark that adjusts for book-to-market. To some degree, this argument parallels that of Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) . They observe that not all high book-to-market stocks are truly out-of-favor. Using a variety of two-way classifications, they find differences in the stock returns of high book-to-market firms. For example, high book-to-market stocks that performed well in the past substantially underperform high book-to-market stocks with poor past performance, or firms that might be considered truly out-of-favor.
On the other hand, if managers in low book-to-market firms have the same ability to recognize undervaluation, they too will tend to announce buybacks when their stock is undervalued. However, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) suggest that few of these stocks are truly underpriced. If underpricing were the only motive for repurchasing shares, one would expect few low book-to-market companies to be involved in buybacks. Yet the evidence in Table 2 shows that the propensity for low book-to-market firms to announce buybacks is nearly the same as for high book-to-market firms. Thus, for these firms, the motivation for repurchasing shares would not seem to be dominated by undervaluation. For example, managers in low book-to-market firms may view buybacks as a way to artificially support prices that have typically risen dramatically in the recent past. In addition, executives in low book-to-market firms are more likely than executives in high book-to-market firms to take advantage of prior stock performance by exercising options. As these options are exercised, many firms choose to repurchase shares to avoid dilution in ownership. And finally, given the relatively superior past performance of low book-to-market companies, managers in these firms may be more prone to hubris, and thus repurchase shares that are not underpriced. Thus, for firms with low book-to-market ratios, true undervaluation would not appear to be as important a motive for repurchasing shares as it would be for firms at the other end of the spectrum.
In Table 4 , we report long-run performance by book-to-market ranking at the time of the repurchase announcement. Focusing on high book-to-market (or value) stocks in quintile 5, the results are striking. Here, the compounded four-year buy-and-hold return is 135.91%, 45.29% above the reference portfolio return of similar size and book-to-market companies. The associated p-value here is 0.000, meaning that none of the 1,000 pseudo-portfolios specifically formed for this subsample performed as well. 6 This extraordinary performance is not limited to a small number of cases. Value stocks comprise 26.2% of the sample measured on a dollar-weighted basis. To check the robustness of our findings for value stocks, we also calculated long-run performance for this group on a year-by-year basis. In each case, four-year compounded abnormal returns were positive. 7 6 As we observed overall, the positive drift observed in value stocks repurchasing shares is generally confined to the first three years. By year 4, the difference between this portfolio and its respective benchmark, though positive (3.23%), is not significant using traditional confidence levels. As a check, we also examined performance in year 5, and found that the difference narrows further to 2.06%. 7 Four-year compounded abnormal returns can be computed for those announcements made prior to 1989. The aveage four-year compounded abnormal return on a year-by-year basis is as follows: Although we might expect the quintile 5 stocks in our sample to be the most undervalued at the time of the announcement, long-run abnormal performance is not exclusive to this subset. For example, firms in quintile 4, which constitute 21.3% of our sample when measured on a dollar-weighted basis, show average abnormal performance of 12.47% after year 3 with an associated p-value of 0.058. As we move from value stocks toward glamour stocks, long-run performance declines. For example, the mean four-year compounded abnormal return for glamour stocks in quintile 1 is slightly negative, -4.31%.
To investigate further the impact of the book-to-market variable, we examine the determinants of long-run performance following announcements. We do this by estimating a cross-sectional regression where the four-year compounded abnormal return is the dependent variable. If a firm leaves the sample midway through the four-year period, we assume that the stock is sold and that the proceeds are reinvested in the reference portfolio so that four-year performance is available for all companies in our sample. The independent variables are the book-to-market quintile ranking, the size decile ranking, the fraction of shares they intend to repurchase, and the three-year abnormal return prior to the repurchase to control for mean reversion in returns. Although we do not report these results here, book-to-market is by far the strongest variable related to long-run performance.
Robustness
In this section, we examine the robustness of our findings, especially with respect to repurchases announced by value stocks where abnormal returns are particularly high. Specifically, we explore three issues: the impact of takeovers, performance measurement, and multiple announcements.
The impact of takeovers
It is possible that the abnormal performance observed for firms repurchasing shares is caused by an unusually high incidence of takeovers. To the extent that this is not anticipated by the market, the upward drift may be a consequence of takeover premiums. This might be a particularly relevant issue for value stocks, whose relatively low prices may have been attractive to bidding firms. To investigate this possibility, we compared long-run performance overall with that observed for only those firms that survived at least four years following the announcement. Three-year compounded abnormal performance for announcements made between 1980 and 1988 is 13.0%. Of this group, 84.4% survived. Focusing only on survivors, the three-year compounded abnormal return diminishes to 6.7%, though still significant.
For repurchase firms ranked in the highest book-to-market quintile, returns also diminish when we focus on survivors, yet abnormal performance is still extremely positive. Here, compounded three-year abnormal performance falls from 39.7% using all eligible firms to 31.6% when only survivors are examined. The survival rate in this group (86.2%) differs little from that observed overall. Thus, the presence of takeovers in our sample does not appear to explain the abnormal returns of firms that repurchase shares, particularly in those cases in which book-to-market ratios are high and long-run performance is so positive. Fama and French (1993) suggest a three-factor model to measure abnorma 1 performance. The first factor is the excess return to a value-weighted portfolio o f NYSE, ASE, and NASDAQ stocks. The second and third factors represent size and book-to-market factors. These two factors are formed by sorting NYSE, ASE, and NASDAQ stocks on the basis of market equity into either a small-cap or large-cap portfolio measured relative to the median NYSE stock at the end of each June. These same stocks are also independently sorted on the basis of book-to-market into one of three portfolios. Those whose low book-to-market ratios rank them in the bottom 30% of all NYSE stocks are sorted into the first portfolio. Those with ratio values among the middle 40% of all NYSE stocks are included in the second portfolio, while the third portfolio contains those stocks with high book-to-market ratios that rank them among the top 30% of NYSE stocks. Value-weighted returns are calculated on a monthly basis for six portfolios defined from the intersection of the two size portfolios and three book-tomarket portfolios. The size factor in the Fama-French three-factor model is then calculated monthly by taking the difference in the average return between the three small-cap portfolios and the three large-cap portfolios. The book-tomarket factor is calculated similarly, taking the difference in the average return between the two high book-to-market portfolios and the two low book-tomarket portfolios.
Performance measurement
To use this procedure, we form a time series of monthly returns in calendar time. Specifically, we buy companies at the end of the month in which a repurchase announcement is made and keep them for 36 months. The composition of the portfolio changes over time. Each month, the portfolio is rebalanced, new firms are added as they make announcements, and old firms are removed. This results in a time series of monthly returns for announcements between 1980 and 1990. The main puzzle is the extraordinary performance obtained for value stocks. Thus, we again form portfolios based on book-to-market rankings at the time of the repurchase announcement. Excess monthly returns are then regressed on the three Fama-French factors. We exclude from our analysis returns during the first six months of 1980. In these initial months, the number of firms in each portfolio is small. The alpha from each regression is a monthly estimate of abnormal performance similar in spirit to Jensen's alpha, but controls for size and book-to-market factors in addition to the overall market.
This approach differs from the buy-and-hold procedure in several respects. First, returns are rebalanced monthly, thus the abnormal performance measured under this approach is less representative of a realistic investment strategy. Second, this procedure assumes that the coefficients are stable over time, which implies that the characteristics of the portfolios are not changing.
The results are reported in Table 5 . The alpha obtained in the first regression using book-to-market quintile 1 stocks (glamour stocks) is -0.30% per month, though not significant from zero at traditional confidence levels. The alpha obtained using book-to-market quintile 5 stocks (value stocks) is 0.43% per month and is highly significant. The spread in performance between high and low book-to-market firms repurchasing their shares is 0.73% per month, or 8.76% per year, and is consistent with our earlier findings. Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989) suggest an F-statistic to test more formally whether the alphas produced in these regressions are jointly equal to zero. The F-statistic associated with our analysis is 2.624, with an associated probability level of 0.973, thus rejecting the hypothesis that the alphas are jointly equal to zero.
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Although not reported here, we also applied the Fama-French three-factor model in a Returns Across Time and Securities (RATS) framework, which aligns returns in event time. This approach relaxes assumptions regarding parameter stability. Thus, alphas are calculated monthly for 36 months following the repurchase announcement. The difference in alphas between high and low book-to-market stocks averages 0.69% per month, a result similar to the calendar-time approach.
Multiple announcements
Nearly one-fourth of our cases are firms that had a repurchase announcement in the prior three years. We examined whether these cases were somehow affecting our results. Firms making repeat repurchase announcements do show strong performance. Compounded abnormal performance after three years for these firms is 15.0%. Yet, repeat announcements cannot explain the abnormal performance we observe overall. Focusing on those firms that announced buybacks for the first time, or those that have not made an announcement in 8 Based on our early approach, we have interpreted the long run to be either three or four years.
Here, we report analysis for a 36-month holding period. However, our results are not overly sensitive to the holding period assumed. When we extend the holding period to 48 months, the difference in alpha between quintile 1 and quintile 5 is essentially the same as before (0.74% per month). The associated F-statistics is 2.308 with a probability level of 0.952, which again rejects the hypothesis that the alphas from the five regressions are jointly equal to zero.
Book-to-market rank three years, compounded three-year abnormal performance is still impressive, 11.3%.
This finding is also true of high book-to-market stocks. Here, firms making their first repurchase announcement in three years show compounded abnormal performance three years after the announcement of 26.3%. High book-to-market stocks making a repeat announcement have compounded abnormal performance after three years of 56.4%. If managers seek to acquire shares from the market at bargain prices, rather than announce one large share repurchase, they might instead opt for a series of smaller announcements stretching over several years. Furthermore, if the market underreacts to the first announcement, managers with strong conviction that their shares remain undervalued may choose to make additional announcements.
Conclusions
The literature is rich with reasons for why companies repurchase their own stock, ranging from signaling to being a substitute for cash dividends. Yet managers rarely mention these reasons. Instead, they frequently claim that they are repurchasing shares because prevailing market prices 'undervalue' the stock and that it is a 'good investment'. Despite this public endorsement, the average market response to the news of an open market share repurchase is only 3.5%. Such a small reaction seems inconsistent with the undervaluation theme voiced by managers. Either the market ignores a substantial portion of this undervaluation signal, or managers are overly optimistic about their firm's value.
We find that on average, the market underreacts to open market share repurchase announcements. Using a buy-and-hold strategy, four-year abnormal performance following the announcement is more than 12%. When the announcement and long-run returns are combined, the magnitude of the total undervaluation is about 15%, a level more consistent with manager's claims of mispricing.
Undervaluation is an important reason motivating share repurchases, but other reasons also exist. To distinguish undervaluation from these other motivations, we sort firms on the basis of book-to-market ratios. Undervaluation is more likely to drive repurchases by high book-to-market companies, while other reasons may motivate repurchases announced by companies with low ratios. For those cases in which undervaluation is the dominant reason, a more substantial post-announcement drift might be expected, even after controlling for overall book-to-market effects in stock returns. For example, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) show that not all high book-to-market stocks are true out-of-favor stocks. True out-of-favor stocks will show higher returns in the future compared with high book-to-market stocks in general. High book-tomarket firms that announce stock buybacks seem more likely to be truly out-of-favor. This indeed appears to be the case. Firms ranked in the top book-to-market quintile have four-year abnormal performance of 45.3% following the repurchase announcement. This occurs using a benchmark that explicitly controls for size and book-to-market effects in stock returns. This impressive performance cannot be explained by an abnormally high incidence of takeovers.
Firms in the bottom two book-to-market quintiles exhibit abnormal returns close to zero or slightly negative, suggesting that true undervaluation was not a primary motive in these cases. Although book-to-market is closely associated with long-run performance, the initial market reaction to repurchase announcements is surprisingly similar across all book-to-market groups.
This evidence is consistent with other studies that find that managers have market-timing ability. A recent paper by Loughran and Ritter (1994) examines the long-run performance of seasoned equity offerings, a corporate action that is the antithesis of a share repurchase. They find evidence of timing ability by observing that managers tend to issue shares when stock prices are high, and that the worst long-run performance occurs following periods of heavy offering activity. Seyhun (1990) finds that managers successfully timed trades of shares in their own firms following the 1987 crash. We find further evidence that managers possess timing abilities. For some reason, the initial market reaction to management's decision to either issue or remove shares is largely ignored by investors in the short run.
This paper adds to a growing body of literature that finds that the market reaction to news is not always completed over short time periods, an assumption made in many event studies. The full impact of corporate announcements can extend over several years. Other examples of such protracted adjustments include initial as well as seasoned equity offerings, mergers, spinoffs, proxy contests, and, in a related context, fixed-price repurchase tender offers. Given the diverse settings of this research, serious concerns should be raised as to the appropriateness of measuring abnormal performance over short windows to assess the economic impact of corporate decisions. Why the market reaction extends over such long periods of time is an intriguing issue that requires further work. Some answers to this puzzle are provided by Shleifer and Vishny (1990) , who discuss how market inefficiencies can occur in investments with long horizons.
